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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the determinants of systemic risk across Indonesian commercial
banks using quarterly data from 2001Q4 to 2017Q4. Employing four measures of
systemic risk, namely value-at-risk (VaR), historical marginal expected shortfall
(MESH), marginal expected shortfall from GARCH-DCC (MESdcc), and long-run
marginal expected shortfall (LRMES), we find that bank size is positively related to
systemic risk, whereas banks and economic loan activity are negatively related to
systemic risk. These findings suggest that the government needs to regulate loan
activities and to monitor big banks as they have significant impacts on bank systemic
risk.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Indonesian banking sector plays a key role in the country’s financial system
and economy. In 2017, banking sector assets represented about 70% of the total
assets of Indonesia’s financial sector. The global financial crises of 1997/1998 and
2008 significantly impacted Indonesia. For example, the global financial crisis of
1997/1998 caused collapse of several Indonesian banks and the banking sector’s
capital ratio to fall sharply to –16%. In response, the central bank (Bank Indonesia)
maintained financial stability by regulating the banking system through monetary
policy. Besides, this banking sector condition urged Bank Indonesia to improve
liquidity and to maintain stability of the financial system through capital injections.
With regard to the global financial crisis of 2008, the Financial System Stability
Committee decided to shore up the solvency of Bank Century by giving it a large
fund in order to prevent a systemic crisis. This undertaking was controversial in
Indonesia, with critics questioning whether the central bank’s action was necessary
since the cost was too expensive.
In response to the crisis of 2008, the central bank applied Basel II in order to
improve supervision and to improve the banks’ condition in Indonesia. This action
led to an increase in Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) level to 20% in 2015. Basel
agreements are used as the basis of the micro-prudential regulatory framework in
Indonesia and several other countries.1 Later in 2011, the government established
a financial supervisor called Financial Service Authority (FSA). The purpose of
this establishment is to redistribute the supervisory powers of the central bank,
whereby the central bank is in charge of managing systemic risk through macroprudential regulation, while the FSA focuses on idiosyncratic risk through microprudential regulation. In other words, the primary purpose of the two institutions
is to mitigate both systemic and idiosyncratic risk in times of crises.
Systemic risk is the risk of instability faced by an individual institution
that can trigger instability in other institutions, the financial system or even the
overall economy due to the interaction between institutions. The main focus of
systemic risk is that when an institution is in distress, it will create panic in the
financial system and cause other institutions to fail, which may eventually lead
to a financial crisis. Distress in one bank can propagate and distress other banks
because systemic risk affects any system whose components are interconnected.
There are some paradigms in the discussion of systemic risk, including too-big-tofail (TBTF) and too-interconnected-to-fail (TITF) (Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin, & Pe,
2017; Huang, Zhou, & Zhu, 2011; Zhou, 2010). The discussion of TBTF centres
on a condition whereby the institution in distress is large, and, hence, suggests
that size is an important variable (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016). While TITF
focuses on how systemically important an institution is when it is connected to
several institutions; hence, connectedness is an important variable in systemic risk
(Chan-Lau, 2010; Drehmann & Tarashev, 2013). Distress or failure in a banking
system could trigger an economy-wide crisis, if unresolved quickly. As a financial
1

Basel I and Basel II agreements impose minimum capital requirement as a preventive tool against the
unexpected losses (Pillar I). Since the agreements are based on capital adequacy, some factors such
as size, leverage, and connection are ignored. Later, the Basel III agreement was made to address the
problems associated with systemic risks. Basel III also proposes a capital surcharge for Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).
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institution’s idiosyncratic risk can drive systemic risk, micro-prudential policy
is essential to minimizing it. Therefore, a study on systemic risk determinants is
useful to developing sound policies.
This paper examines the determinants of systemic risk in the Indonesian
banking system by employing panel regressions on 16 public commercial banks.
The paper uses market and balance sheet data of the 16 banks over the period from
2001Q4 to 2017Q4. We construct four systemic risk measures using the market
data. These measures of the systemic risk are VaR (Jorion, 2006), MESh (Acharya,
Pedersen, & Richardson, 2017), MESdcc (Engle, 2002), and LRMES (Acharya, Engle,
& Richardson, 2012). VaR is the standard measure of systemic risk and considers
an institution’s worst potential loss, without considering other institutions in the
system. MES measures the marginal contribution of an institution’s risk to the
system. LRMES and MES are similar, since they are rooted in Expected Shortfall
(ES). Their difference is that MES measures the loss when the market falls below a
certain threshold over a given horizon, whereas LRMES simulates the system for
a six-month period and uses the most pessimistic scenarios as the crisis scenarios.
We regressed each of the systemic risk measures on bank characteristics, such
as size, capital, credit risk, reliance on deposit, and liquidity. We also controlled for
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP per capita following Laeven, Ratnovski, &
Tong (2015). We find that both bank size and loan activity are important determinants
of the systemic risk of an institution, which is in line with studies conducted by
Laeven et al., (2015) and Varotto & Zhao (2018). For the macroeconomic variables,
we find that credit to the private sector is an important determinant of systemic
risk. The results are robust across the systemic risk measures, sub-samples, and
forecast horizons. The main contribution of this paper is that it considers several
measures of systemic risk, whereas the literature typically focuses on one measure.
Considering several measures of systemic risk is important because each measure
captures different aspects of systemic risk. Hence, our approach is necessary in
order to get more precise results. We consider LRMES, which is still rarely used
in the literature. In addition to establishing the determinants of systemic risk, our
study utilizes the systemic risk measures to rank the institutions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the
conceptual framework and reviews the related literature. Section III reviews the
systemic risk measurements and outlines the methodology. Section IV presents
the results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
A growing literature examines systemic risk, particularly covering the definition
of systemic risk, its measures and its applications. In their study, De Bandt &
Hartmann (2000) analysed the concept of systemic risk. They argued that the
definition of systemic risk has two crucial components, namely shocks and
propagation mechanism. Based on financial theory, shocks can be idiosyncratic,
affecting the health of only a single financial institution, or systemic, affecting
the whole economy. Propagation mechanism is the most crucial in the concept
of systemic risk. In a simple sense, it is the mechanism through which shocks
transmit from one institution to another. In a financial system, the propagation
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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happens through environmental exposure or through share of information, which
affects trust in the institutions. From a conceptual point of view, this mechanism of
shocks transmission can be seen as the system’s adjustment to a new equilibrium.
In their review, Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin, & Pe (2017) argued that there are
three sources of systemic risk: systemic risk-taking, contagion mechanism, and
amplification mechanism. Systemic risk-taking explains an institution’s behaviour
towards taking a risk, which is significant and similar to or correlated with other
institutions. The contagion mechanism is the spill-over effect from one institution
to another, whereas the amplification mechanism explains how small shocks build
up into a full blown systemic risk.
A second strand of literature focuses on the systemic risk measures. One of
the earliest measures of systemic risk is VaR (see Jorion, 2006). VaR estimates
possible losses of a financial institution at a given probability. The limitation of
this measure is that it only focuses on the risk of an institution as an individual,
not as a part of a system. To address this limitation, Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016)
extended VaR by measuring the contribution of an institution’s risk to the system
using Conditional VaR (CoVaR) and ∆CoVaR. CoVaR is defined as the value at
risk of a financial system conditional on an institution being in distress, while
∆CoVaR measures changes in an institution’s CoVaR in its distress and median
states. Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016) use quantile regression to estimate the value
of ∆CoVaR of each institution, since the method is simple. Girardi & Ergün (2013)
then modified the calculation of CoVaR by using Generalized Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. They also changed the definition
of the financial distress from being exact to at most at its VaR. By doing so, they
were able to consider a more extreme distress event and improve the consistency
of the measure.
Apart from VaR, the Expected Shortfall (ES) is a measure of systemic risk
that has been substantially developed. The ES is defined as a systemic condition
of institutions conditional on the overall system’s shortfall. The latest popular
measure is the MES proposed by Acharya et al. (2017). This measure is an
extension of ES, which explains the marginal contribution of a financial institution
to a system. Acharya et al. (2017) extended the MES and creating a new measure,
namely Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), which reveals the tendency of a financial
system to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized.
Another extension of MES is Component Expected Shortfall (CES), which was
developed by Banulescu, Denisa, & Dumitrescu (2014). It decomposes the ES,
while accounting for the characteristics of the institution, which compensates
the shortcoming of the MES. This measure also combines two concepts: the toobig-to-fail and too-interconnected-to-fail. Another extension of the MES, LRMES,
proposed by Acharya et al. (2012), measures the expected loss of an institution’s
equity generated from the simulation of the system’s condition in the future—for
example, six months into the future. Brownlees & Engle (2017) also extended the
MES measure and introduced SRISK. This measure considers the liabilities and
size of the financial institution in the calculation of systemic risk. SRISK measures
the capital shortfall of an institution conditional on a severe market decline, which
can influence the whole financial system. Brownlees & Engle (2017) constructed the
measure using the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticityhttps://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss1/7
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v23i1
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Dynamic Conditional Correlation (GARCH-DCC) model following Engle (2002)
because the model can capture the stylized facts of the data effectively.
Another systemic measure is Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP) proposed
by Huang, Zhou, & Zhu (2011). The concepts of DIP and ES are similar in that
both are based on the conditional expectations of portfolio losses under extreme
conditions, but their respective definitions of the extreme condition are different.
While ES defines the state based on the percentile distribution, DIP employs a given
threshold loss of the underlying portfolio to determine the condition. DIP is also
closely related to CoVaR in the sense that it focuses on identifying the systemically
important institutions and banks’ marginal contribution. The CoVaR focuses on
the spill-over effect from one bank’s failure on the system. In comparison, DIP
focuses on the loss of a group of banks restricted on the condition of the system
being in distress. Allen, Bali, & Tang (2012) derived an aggregate systemic risk
measure, namely Catastrophic Risk of Financial Firms (CATFIN). This measure
is estimated using both VaR and ES methodologies, which are estimated using
three distributions: (1) parametric distribution based on Generalized Pareto
Distribution (GDP), (2) parametric distribution based on Skewed Generalized
Error Distribution (SGED), and (3) nonparametric distribution.
Our paper is related closely to the literature that measures systemic risk
and examines determinants of systemic risk for banks. Studies on systemic risk
are mainly conducted for US and European banks. For example, Brunnermeier,
Dong, & Palia (2012) studied the systemic risk of a large sample of US banks. They
decompose the systemic risk into three components: a tail risk, interconnectedness
risk, and exposure risk. They find that systemic risk is related to banks’
reliance on non-interest income. Puzanova & Düllmann (2013) investigated the
relationship between bank characteristics and systemic risk. They find that bank
capital is a crucial modifier of the connection between size and systemic risk.
Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong (2015) investigated the relationship between bank
characteristics (capital, size, funding, and activities) and systemic risk during
the global financial crisis of 2008. They find that the systemic risk is positively
related to bank size and negatively related to bank capital. Varotto & Zhao (2018)
find support for this evidence and argue that the size of the firm fundamentally
drives systemic risk indicators. This result signifies the problem of too-big-tofail institutions. There are several other variables related to systemic risk, such
as lending concentration (Beck & Jonghe, 2013), interbank exposures (Drehmann
& Tarashev, 2013), institutional environment (Anginer, Demirgüç-kunt, & Mare,
2018), among others. We follow Laeven et al. (2015) and focus on bank size, capital,
and activities as the fundamental determinants of systemic risk.
Prior studies used systemic risk measures to rank financial institutions based
on their importance. Castro & Ferrari (2014) use ∆CoVaR to identify and rank the
systemically important institutions. Using a sample of 26 large European banks,
they show that ∆CoVaR and time-variation of ∆CoVaR can be used to rank only
a few banks. Aside that, they show that accounting for bank characteristics in the
∆CoVaR framework may improve the ranking of banks. Benoit, Colletaz, Hurlin, &
Pérignon (2013) used several systemic risk measures to rank the importance of US
financial institutions. They discovered that each risk measure identified different
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) and the ranks obtained
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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from the systemic risk estimations were akin to the ranks from sorting the firms
based on the market risk or liabilities. Nucera, Schwaab, Koopman, & Jan (2016)
employed both price-based rankings (VaR, ΔCoVaR, and MES) and fundamentalbased rankings (Leverage and SRISK), and pooled the systemic risk rankings using
principal component analysis. By doing so, they untangle the idiosyncratic part
and other signals from the systemic risk rankings. They find that the combined
ranking is more stable and less volatile.
Since one of the crucial features of systemic risk is its potential effect on the real
economy (Kambhu, Schuermann, & Stiroh, 2007), there are studies that connect
the systemic risk measures to real economic activity. Allen et al. (2012) employed
a measure of aggregate systemic risk and forecast the macroeconomic downturns
in six months proxied by gross domestic production, industrial production,
unemployment rate, the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and
many other macroeconomic variables. They find that their aggregate systemic risk
measure is a robust predictor of future economic downturns. Giglio, Kelly, & Pruitt
(2016) evaluated the effect of systemic risk on the real economy. They employed 19
measures of systemic risk and find that the measures certainly incorporated some
information regarding the likelihood of future macroeconomic downturns. They
even find that the indicators of systemic risk are able to forecast policy decisions.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Sample
Our sample is made up of listed commercial banks in Indonesia over the period of
2001Q4 to 2017Q4. We decided to use these listed banks because the measures of
systemic risk are based on equity returns. We excluded Islamic banks since they
have different accounting rules. The final sample comprises of 16 banks whose
assets represent 71.50% of total assets of Indonesian commercial banks in 2017.
The determinants of the systemic risk consist of several bank characteristics
and macroeconomic variables. The frequency of the data is quarterly. The bank
characteristics are bank size (natural logarithm of total assets), capital ratio (total
equity to total assets), funding source (total deposits to total assets), loan activities
(total loans to total assets), and liquidity ratio (total cash to total assets). We
obtained the bank data from the balance sheets and income statements of banks’
interim reports.
In addition to bank characteristics, we follow Laeven et al. (2015) to uses
various macroeconomic indicators. The variables are gross domestic product
(GDP) growth (variance of GDP growth) to proxy economic stability, GDP per
capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita) to proxy economic development, and
private credit (private credit to GDP) to measure the financial structure. The data
for the macroeconomic variables was obtained from Bank Indonesia’s website and
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data website. The list of variables
and their calculations is presented in Appendix A. To calculate the idiosyncratic
and systemic risk measures, we use daily stock price data of the banks, which we
obtained from The Indonesia Capital Market Institute (TICMI).

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss1/7
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B. Systemic Risk Measures
We measured systemic risk using VaR, MES, and LRMES. VaR is one of the
earliest measures of systemic risk. The idea of VaR is to estimate the maximum
value of an institution’s loss in a given period within a confidence level. We
calculated the measure following Jorion (2006) as:
(1)
where Xi is the equity return of bank i and (1-α) is the confidence level. A higher
value of VaR indicates a high level of a bank’s systemic risk.
Another measure is the extension of ES, which proxies the crisis in the financial
system using the aggregate loss. ES uses the condition that the equity return of a
bank exceeds a given threshold to define systemic risk. The formula is as follows:
(2)
(3)
where R is the return of a portfolio and C is the given threshold, which is usually
based on the VaR level. We can decompose the portfolio return into the sum of
each bank’s contribution (ri) with their proportional weights (yi) as presented in
the equation below:

(4)

Therefore, we can write the ES in terms of banks’ weight as follows:

(5)

One of the extensions of ES is MES as proposed by Acharya et al. (2017), which
measures the contribution of each bank to the extreme value of the market return.
MES also shows the sensitivity of market risk to each bank. The formula is as
follows:
(6)
where MESαi is bank i’s MES with confidence 1-α. This means that MES measures
the risk of each bank to the system. A high value of MES indicates a high
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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contribution of a bank’s risk to the system. There are several ways to estimate
MES: (i) the first is by using historical data (MESH); (ii) the second is by using
GARCH-DCC as proposed by Engle (2002); (iii) and the last is by using copula
approaches following Jiang & Long (2018).
We also used the LRMES measure of systemic risk, which is the long-run MES.
The LRMES measures the expectation of a financial institution’s equity conditional
on the systemic event, which can be written as:
(7)
where Rit+1:t+h is the multiperiod arithmetic equity returns from period t+1 until t+h.
This measure is then approximated by Acharya et al., (2012) using daily MES as
follows:
(8)
This measures a bank’s future expected loss.
C. Empirical Specifications
To understand the determinants of systemic and idiosyncratic risks in Indonesian
banks, we regress systemic and idiosyncratic risks on bank characteristics and
macroeconomic variables as follows:
(9)
where yit+h is the risk associated with bank i at time-t+h, namely idiosyncratic
risk (return) and systemic risk (VaR, MESH, MESdcc, and LRMES). BCit is a vector
of bank characteristics at time t, and Mit is a vector of macroeconomic variables
at time t. The bank characteristics are bank size (Size), capital ratio (ETA),
funding source (DTA), loan activities (LTA), and liquidity ratio (CTA), while the
macroeconomic variables are GDP growth (GDPg), GDP per capita (GDPc), and
private credit (PRIVCRED). h is the forecast horizon; for the main regression, we
used h=1 to predict the one-quarter ahead systemic risk.
Since the regression is predictive with h=1, the dependent variable uses t+1 data
from 2002Q1 to 2017Q4, while the independent variable uses the information from
2001Q4 to 2017Q3. We performed the Likelihood Ratio, F-test, and the Hausmann
test to determine the best estimator.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Summary Statistics
Since we use a predictive regression, summary statistics for the independent
variables are based on data from 2001Q4 to 2017Q3, whereas those for the
dependent variables are based on data from 2002Q1 to 2017Q4. Table 1 reports the
summary statistics for the independent variables and the risk measures.
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol23/iss1/7
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The summary statistics show that the bank characteristics are mainly positive
over the sample period, except for capital ratio. The minimum value of the capital
ratio is negative over the sample period, which indicates poor performance of
the banks during certain quarters or years. For the macroeconomic variables,
the variance of GDP growth has a maximum value of 11.4, which is quite large.
This indicates a significant change in GDP growth over the sample period. The
other macroeconomic variables are quite steady as the difference between their
maximum and minimum values is small as compared with that of GDP growth.
Aside these summary statistics, we present the correlation between variables
in Table 2. The table shows that some of the bank characteristics are correlated with
the systemic risk measures. The liquidity condition is also significantly correlated
to the systemic risk measures, except for VaR. The correlation coefficients are low,
meaning that multicollinearity should not be a major problem. The table also
shows that all of the systemic risk measures are significantly correlated to one
another—some highly correlated, and others negligibly correlated. This shows
that the different measures of systemic risk capture different aspects of systemic
risk.
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables. The variables are: Size, the natural logarithm of total assets;
ETA is total equity to total assets; DTA is total deposit to total assets; LTA is total loan to total assets; CTA is total cash
to total assets; GDPg is the variance of GDP growth; GDPc is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita; PRIVECRED
is the ratio of private credit to GDP; Return is measured in logarithm formula; VaR is the value-at-risk; MESH is MES
calculated using historical data; MESdcc is MES calculated using GARCH-DCC; and last LRMES is the long-run MES.
The table presents the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and the value in 25th
percentile and 75th percentile.

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev

Max

Min

P25

P75

Size
ETA
DTA
LTA
CTA
GDPg
GDPc
PRIVCRED
Return
VaR
MESH
MESdcc
LRMES

993
993
993
993
993
64
64
64
993
993
993
993
993

17.6244
0.1087
0.7673
0.5600
0.0139
1.7866
15.5897
0.3023
0.0122
0.0661
0.0303
0.0256
0.7322

1.7156
0.0374
0.1052
0.1385
0.0075
2.6360
0.5659
6.1469
0.1068
0.0375
0.0333
0.0205
1.2957

20.7990
0.2984
1.1003
0.7977
0.0504
11.4038
16.3788
0.406
0.8976
0.2793
0.1787
0.1954
32.7035

12.7939
-0.1222
0.0279
0.1147
0.0002
0.0245
14.6049
0.234
-0.7016
0
-0.1279
-0.0229
-0.3382

14.1582
0.0509
0.5850
0.2293
0.0025
0.4455
15.4241
0.263
-0.1945
0.0115
-0.0208
0.0005
0.0093

20.4662
0.1942
0.8854
0.7505
0.0300
0.9707
15.9143
0.291
0.2559
0.1441
0.1015
0.0687
2.4464

B. Systemic Risk
The systemic risk measures can be used to investigate the systemic importance
of the banks. That is, based on the systemic risk measures, we can rank the banks
based on their systemic importance. Using the systemic risk measures, we listed
the names of the banks with a high level of systemic risk. Table 3 presents the top
five banks with the largest systemic risk in the year 2017.
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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Size

1
0.25***
-0.03
-0.01
0.60***
-0.12***
0.45***
0.39***
0.11***
-0.11***
0.41***
0.50***
0.25***

Variable

Size
ETA
DTA
LTA
CTA
GDPg
GDPc
PRCRED
Return
VaR
MESH
MESdcc
LRMES

1
0.11***
0.17***
0.05
0.01
-0.05*
0.06*
-0.28***
-0.11***
-0.06**
-0.04

DTA

1
-0.03
-0.09***
0.53***
0.40***
-0.10***
-0.24***
-0.17***
-0.21***
-0.10***

LTA

1
0.02
0.16***
-0.01
0.13***
-0.04
0.27***
0.36***
0.21***

CTA

1
-0.29***
-0.34***
-0.03
-0.02
0.08***
0.04
0.05

GDPg

1
0.82***
-0.04
-0.10***
-0.02
0.03
0.002

GDPc

1
-0.04
-0.11***
-0.11***
-0.06**
-0.06**

PRCRED

1
-0.02
0.09***
0.09***
-0.01

return

1
0.16***
0.21***
0.15***

VaR

1
0.53***
0.29***

1
0.77***

MESH MESdcc

1

LRMES

110

1
-0.51***
0.10***
0.002
-0.12***
0.34***
0.34***
0.06*
-0.05
0.12***
0.13***
0.04

ETA

This table presents the correlation matrix for the variables in the regression of the 16 samples from the public commercial banks in Indonesia. The asterisk presents the significances of
the correlations. The variables are (i) Size, the natural logarithm of total asset; (ii) ETA, the ratio of equity to total assets; (iii) DTA, the ratio of deposits to total asset; (iv) LTA, the ratio of
loans to total asset; (v) CTA, the ratio of cash to total asset; (vi) GDPg, the growth of GDP; (vii) GDPc, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita; (viii) PRCERD (PRIVCRED), is the ratio
of private credit to GDP; (ix) Return, is the daily return of the bank; (x) VaR, is the value at risk; (xi) MESH, is the MES estimated from historical; (xii) MESdcc, is the MES estimated using
GARCH-DCC; and lastly (xiii) LRMES, is the long-run MES. Finally, * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 10% (5%) 1%.

Table 2.
Correlation Table
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Banks with the largest systemic risk based on VaR, MESH, MESdcc, and
LRMES are in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. The list of the banks based
on VaR and MES measures are significantly different, which highlights how the
measures captured different aspects of systemic risk. This result is in line with
Nucera et al. (2016) who find that different systemic risk measures signal different
messages. This result suggests the need for using more than one measure of the
systemic risk, since each measure might only incorporate a different aspect of
systemic risk. From the table, it can also be seen that MESdcc and LRMES yielded
the same ranking, which indicates that both measures capture the same features
of systemic risk.
We can also plot the systemic risk measures in order to see their patterns over
the sample period. Figure 1 shows plots of the systemic risk measures. The figure
reveals that VaR and MESH have a quite similar pattern, especially during the
second half of the sample period, while MESdcc and LRMES have a similar pattern
during the same period. The magnitude of LRMES is high because it measures
the long-run value of MES, which is an accumulation of MES values over a period
of time. From the figure, we can see that VaR and MESH are less sensitive than
MESdcc and LRMES in detecting a crisis period, which comes from the different
aspects of systemic risk they captured. Note that all the measures produce same
result between 2008Q1 and 2009Q1—they all indicated high systemic risk—which
happened to be the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). After the GFC period, all the
measures show an unstable pattern. They showed ups and downs and another
peak in 2011Q3. Towards the end of the sample period, the systemic risk measures
showed declining patterns, indicating an improvement in the safety and soundness
of the banking system.
Table 3.
Systemic Risk Ranking
This table list the names of five banks with largest systemic risk in terms of VaR, MESH, MESdcc, and LRMES in the
period of January 2017 until December 2017.

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2

Bank
Panel A: Based on VaR measures
PT. Bank Mayapada International Tbk
PT. Bank OCBC NISP Tbk
PT. Bank Artha Graha International Tbk
PT. Bank Mega Tbk
PT. Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk
Panel B: Based on MESH measures
PT. Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk
PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk
PT. Bank Maybank Indonedia Tbk
PT. Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk
PT. Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk
Panel C: Based on MESdcc measures
PT. Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk
PT. Bank Mega Tbk
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Table 3.
Systemic Risk Ranking (Continued)
Rank
3
4
5

Bank
PT. Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk
PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk
PT. Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk
Panel D: Based on LRMES measures
PT. Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk
PT. Bank Mega Tbk
PT. Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk
PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk
PT. Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk

1
2
3
4
5

Figure 1.
The Average Value of the Banks’ Systemic Risk Measure
The figure plots the average value of banks systemic risk for each measure for the sample period 2002Q1-2017Q1.
Panel (a) shows the results of Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Historical Marginal Expected Shortfall (MESH). Panel (b) shows
the results of Marginal Expected Shortfall estimated from GARCH-DCC (MESdcc), and Long-run Marginal Expected
Shortfall (LRMES).
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Figure 1.
The Average Value of the Banks’ Systemic Risk Measure (Continued)
(b) MESdcc and LRMES (×102)
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C. Regression Results
In this subsection, we present the regression results of all of the risk measures. We
use a one-quarter ahead predictive regression, and summarize the results in Table
4. The dependent variables are the risk measures proxied by return, VaR, MESH,
MESdcc, and LRMES, while the independent variables are bank characteristics
and macroeconomic variables.
The first column of Table 4 shows the determinants of banks’ idiosyncratic
risk, measured by the stock returns. We find that capital, funding source, credit
risk, and liquidity risk are significant predictors of idiosyncratic risk. Their signs
indicate that stock return is significantly higher for banks with higher capital, more
funding from deposits, fewer loan activities, and less cash. The significance of cash
to the stock return might be due to investment activity. More cash means that the
bank does not make much investment, which can be seen as lower profitability in
the future. This is why the stock return will later on be lower if the present level
of cash is high. Column (2) reports the results for VaR as the dependent variable.
We find that almost all of the bank characteristics are significant at 1% level. The
results show that higher risk is related to bigger size, lower capital ratio, lower
reliance to deposit, lower loan activity, and higher liquidity.
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for the MESH and MESdcc regressions,
respectively. Bank size and loan activity are significant in both regressions.
Whereas liquidity condition is significant 1% level in the MESdcc regression, it
is not in the MESH regression. By comparing the two MES estimates, it can be
seen that the DCC-GARCH approach performs slightly better than the historical
approach. Column (5) shows the results for the LRMES regression. These results
are consistent with the finding that bank size and liquidity condition are significant
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predictors of systemic risk. The sign of the coefficients suggests that the bigger
the size and the higher the liquidity, the higher the systemic risk. We find an
interesting result that banks’ loan activity is negatively related to systemic risk.
This is an anomaly since it contradicts the common belief that loan activity is risky
and can lead to non-performing loans.
For the macroeconomic variables, none is a significant predictor of bank
return, whereas private credit consistently predicts systemic risk at 1%. The sign
of private credit is negative, implying that systemic risk is higher when the credit
to the private sector is lower. In addition to private credit, the growth of GDP is
weakly significant in the MES historical regression. The remaining macroeconomic
variables do not predict systemic risk.
Table 4.
Regression Result
This table presents the result of panel regression for several systemic risk measures. The dependent variables are the
systemic risk measures and the independent variables are the bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables. The
equation is as follow: yit+h=αi+β1 Sizeit+β2 ETAit+β3 DTAit+β4 LTAit+β5 CTAit+γ1 GDPgit+γ2 GDPcit+γ3 PRIVCREDit+εit+1. Size
= the natural logarithm of total asset, ETA = total equity to total assets, DTA = total deposit to total assets, LTA = total
loan to total assets, CTA = total cash to total assets, GDPg = variance of GDP growth, GDPc = natural logarithm of GDP
per capita, and PRIVCRED = private credit to GDP. The samples are 16 commercial banks in Indonesia. Numbers in
parentheses are the t-statistics. Finally, * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 10% (5%) 1%.

Variable
Size
ETA
DTA
LTA
CTA
GDPg
GDPc
PRIVCRED
Constant
Number of observations
Adjusted R-Squared
Prob(F-stat)

Return
(1)

VaR
(2)

MESH
(3)

MESdcc
(4)

LRMES
(5)

0.0047
(1.60)
0.4073***
(3.57)
0.1295***
(3.35)
-0.0572*
(-1.88)
-0.0572*
(1.87)
-0.0031
(-1.51)
-0.0182
(-1.44)
-0.0341
(-0.33)
0.1058
(0.65)
993
0.0399
0.000

0.0178***
(4.75)
-0.2226***
(-5.39)
-0.1663***
(-11.00)
-0.1191***
(-9.66)
0.4576*
(1.92)
-0.0003
(-0.54)
0.0024
(0.41)
-0.1340***
(-4.12)
-0.0309
(-0.60)
993
0.3491
0.000

0.0098***
(5.65)
0.0279
(0.80)
-0.0076
(-0.64)
-0.0185*
(-1.77)
-0.1921
(-0.97)
0.0009*
(1.77)
0.0058
(1.47)
-0.1942***
(-7.02)
-0.1597***
(-3.59)
993
0.0733
0.000

0.0052***
(4.27)
-0.0246
(-1.29)
0.0045
(0.68)
-0.0162***
(-2.82)
0.2887***
(2.64)
0.0002
(0.79)
0.0028
(1.22)
-0.0761***
(-5.05)
-0.0831***
(-3.42)
993
0.0813
0.000

0.1678***
(2.71)
-1.3541
(-0.88)
-0.3322
(-0.64)
-0.2255
(-0.49)
18.4402**
(2.12)
0.0211
(0.88)
0.1108
(0.67)
-3.2957***
(-2.66)
-2.7478
(-1.38)
993
0.0256
0.000
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These results show that bank size is essential when we talk about systemic risk,
which in line with studies such as Laeven et al., (2015) and Varotto & Zhao (2018).
Besides, this finding supports the theory of too-big-too-fail, which argues that big
banks may act less cautiously in taking risk, since they may get subsidies in case
of crisis. For this reason, the government and central bank need to monitor big
banks more closely as they have higher systemic risk than small banks. Another
point to consider is that regulating credit activity is crucial since credit activity is a
significant determinant of banks’ systemic risk.
D. Robustness Checks
This section shows the results of the robustness tests. Since the size of the bank is
considered important, we tested whether the results are not driven by large and
small banks. We conducted this robustness test by excluding the five largest and
smallest banks in terms of assets. Besides, our results could be driven by the oneperiod forecast horizon. And, hence, the second robustness test aimed to increase
the forecast horizon to see the sensitivity of the estimates to the forecast horizon.
The first robustness excluded the five largest and smallest banks, according
to the size of total assets in 2017, meaning that only six banks are used in this
robustness test. Table 5 presents these results. Consistent with the main regressions,
the results show that size, loan activity, and private credit are significant predictors
of systemic risk. The signs are also consistent with the main estimates, showing
bigger size, and lower loan activity and private credit are related to higher systemic
risk. This shows that the results are robust and are neither driven by the big banks
nor by the small banks.
In the second robustness test, we test whether the results are driven by the
forecast horizon. To do this, we used four-quarter instead of the one-quarter ahead
forecast horizon, when predicting systemic risk. The results, which are presented
in Table 6, are consistent with the main ones. These results show that size, loan
activity, and private credit are significant determinants of systemic risk. The
results also show that the performance of the model increased as we increased the
forecast horizon. This can be observed by the increasing value of R2 of the model.
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Table 5.
Robustness result – Exclude five largest and five smallest banks
This table presents the result of the first robustness test by employing panel regression for several systemic risk measures.
We exclude five largest banks and five smallest banks according to the total asset. The dependent variables are the systemic
risk measures and the independent variables are the bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables. The equation is
as follow: yit+h=αi+β1 Sizeit+β2 ETAit+β3 DTAit+β4 LTAit+β5 CTAit+γ1 GDPgit+γ2 GDPcit+γ3 PRIVCREDit+εit+1. Size = the natural
logarithm of total asset, ETA = total equity to total assets, DTA = total deposit to total assets, LTA = total loan to total
assets, CTA = total cash to total assets, GDPg = variance of GDP growth, GDPc = natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and
PRIVCRED = private credit to GDP. The samples are 6 commercial banks in Indonesia. Numbers in parentheses are the
t-statistics. Finally, * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 10% (5%) 1%.

Variable
Size
ETA
DTA
LTA
CTA
GDPg
GDPc
PRIVCRED
Constant
Number of observations
Adjusted R-Squared
Prob(F-stat)

VaR
(1)

MESH
(2)

MESdcc
(3)

LRMES
(4)

0.0221**
(2.58)
-0.1688***
(-2.88)
0.0625**
(2.12)
-0.1803***
(-9.63)
1.2174***
(3.66)
-0.0004
(-0.45)
0.0088
(0.67)
-0.0875*
(-1.83)
-0.3835***
(-4.39)
384
0.4625
0.000

0.0241***
(2.57)
-0.0321
(-0.50)
-0.0392
(-1.21)
-0.0488**
(-2.38)
-0.3828
(-1.05)
0.0007
(0.75)
0.0007
(0.05)
-0.2871***
(-5.47)
-0.2643***
(-2.76)
384
0.3317
0.000

0.0218***
(9.56)
0.0949***
(3.11)
-0.0362**
(-2.14)
-0.0434***
(-4.57)
0.3589**
(1.99)
0.0005
(0.86)
-0.0177***
(-3.85)
-0.1213***
(-4.17)
-0.0228
(-0.46)
384
0.4018
0.000

0.6787***
(2.76)
1.0702
(0.33)
-2.0959
(-1.15)
-1.0075
(-0.99)
38.7463**
(2.00)
0.0559
(0.99)
-0.6461
(-1.31)
-3.1777
(-1.02)
0.8747
(0.17)
384
0.0494
0.000
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Table 6.
Robustness result – Forecast horizon
This table presents the result of the second robustness test by employing panel regression for several systemic risk
measures. We increase the forecast horizon to h=4 quarters ahead. The dependent variables are the systemic risk
measures and the independent variables are the bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables. The equation is as
follow: yit+h=αi+β1 Sizeit+β2 ETAit+β3 DTAit+β4 LTAit+β5 CTAit+γ1 GDPgit+γ2 GDPcit+γ3 PRIVCREDit+εit+1. Size = the natural
logarithm of total asset, ETA = total equity to total assets, DTA = total deposit to total assets, LTA = total loan to total
assets, CTA = total cash to total assets, GDPg = variance of GDP growth, GDPc = natural logarithm of GDP per capita,
and PRIVCRED = private credit to GDP. The samples are 16 commercial banks in Indonesia. Numbers in parentheses
are the t-statistics. Finally, * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 10% (5%) 1%.

Variable
Size
ETA
DTA
LTA
CTA
GDPg
GDPc
PRIVCRED
Constant
Number of observations
Adjusted R-Squared
Prob(F-stat)

VaR
(1)

MESH
(2)

MESdcc
(3)

LRMES
(4)

0.0121***
(3.44)
-0.3737***
(-9.69)
-0.1931***
(-13.73)
-0.0784***
(-6.74)
0.1539
(0.67)
0.0007
(1.31)
0.0106*
(1.94)
-0.1193***
(-3.98)
-0.0486
(-1.01)
945
0.3845
0.000

0.0094***
(5.29)
0.0524
(1.46)
0.0002
(0.02)
-0.0307***
(-2.85)
-0.4733**
(-2.27)
0.0021***
(3.93)
0.0066*
(1.65)
-0.1948***
(-6.93)
0.1682***
(-3.69)
945
0.0924
0.000

0.0050***
(4.03)
-0.0197
(-0.99)
-0.0022
(-0.33)
-0.0265***
(-4.44)
0.0426
(0.37)
0.0009***
(3.06)
0.0053**
(2.24)
-0.0864***
(-5.63)
-0.1037***
(-4.16)
945
0.0798
0.000

0.2164***
(3.37)
-1.0437
(-0.65)
-0.8094
(-1.52)
-0.8390*
(-1.74)
0.7739
(0.08)
0.0607**
(2.47)
0.2435
(1.41)
-4.5066***
(-3.52)
-4.5083**
(-2.18)
945
0.0333
0.000

V. CONCLUSION
Building upon the systemic risk literature, this study investigates the determinants
of systemic risk across publicly listed commercial banks in Indonesia. Employing
four systemic risk measures, namely VaR, MESH, MESdcc, and LRMES, we show
that each measure captures a different aspect of systemic risk. Two measures,
MESdcc and LRMES, show a similar pattern over the sample period. This finding
emphasizes the importance of using more than one systemic risk measure in order
to generate more precise estimates. Despite the fact that each measure captures a
different aspect of systemic risk, our results show that their patterns are almost
the same. However, the VaR and MESH measures are less sensitive to indicating a
crisis than MESdcc and LRMES.
Our study also shows robust evidence that bank size, loan activity, and private
credit are significant predictors of banks’ systemic risk. Larger banks, and lower
loan activity and credit allocated to private sector are related to higher systemic
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020

17

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 23, No. 1 [2020], Art. 7
118

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 23, Number 1, 2020

risk. The effect of bank size on systemic risk is even stronger in the long run,
using the LRMES measure. This result supports the theory that big banks pose
excessive systemic risk to the banking system, and thus highlights the need to
regulate and to monitor the activities of large banks. The results also indicate the
need for the government to control loan activities in the country, since the level
of private credit in Indonesia is a significant determinant of banks’ systemic risk.
An interesting result is that the impact of loan activity on systemic risk is negative,
which contradicts the common belief. Therefore, this could be a direction for
further research. Future studies could investigate the role of loan activity in bank
performance and its impact on systemic risk.
Our study does not establish evidence in support of the too-interconnectedto-fail hypothesis. Even though we find that large banks do have a high systemic
risk, we also need to see the connection of the banks in the system since it
can be the channelling path for the shock when crisis happens. Therefore,
further research should focus on calculating and incorporating, and exploring
the interconnectedness of the banking system, since this may create a clear
understanding of the contagious paths of the shocks to the system.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. List of Variables
Variable
Size
ETA
DTA
LTA
CTA
GDPg
GDPc
PRIVCRED
Return

Proxy

Calculation

Bank Size
Capital
Reliance of Funding to deposits
Credit Risk
Liquidity Risk
Economic Stability
Economic Development
Financial Structure
Idiosyncratic Risk

Natural logarithm of Total Assets
Ratio of Total Equity to Total Assets
Ratio of Total Deposits to Total Assets
Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets
Ratio of Total Cash to Total Assets
Variance of GDP Growth
Natural logarithm of GDP per Capita
Ratio of Private credit to GDP
Variance of bank stock return
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